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Special artile ___ 
Tax Buoyancy Estimates for Indian States 
With the introduction of a destination-based VAT in all but eight states starting April 2005, 
there is need for a good baseline indicator of tax buoyancies in states in the period 
immediately preceding. Thi s to provide such a base, with buoyancies 
estimated over a 23-year span starting in 1980-81. If estimated over a sufficiently long 
period of time, the buoyancy coefficient essentially estimates the underlying revenue- 
generating properties of the system with endogenised tax policy. A log linear trend fit over 
the entire period showed serial correlation, which is eliminated for all but one state, Assam, 
with the introduction of structural breaks. A third specification, including the log of the 
per cent share of industry in the domestic product, eliminates serial correlation for 
Assam, and imnproves the goodness-of-fit for some other states. In all but six states, 
the sign of the change in the buoyancy coefficient at the break is positive. Where the 
buoyancy-enhancing break occurs in the late 1990s, the spurt in tax effort mnight have been 
an endogenous response to the expenditure shock from implementation of the higher 
salary scales recommended by the Fifth Pay Commission. 
INDIRA RAJARAMAN, RAJAN GOYAL, JEEVAN KUMAR KHUNDRAKPAM 
T ax buoyancy estimates, which measure the percentage 
response of tax revenue to a one per cent change in the 
tax base, usually proxied by the gross domestic product, 
are a routine requirement for fiscal projection purposes. The 
elasticity of tax revenue is more stringently defined as the 
underlying revenue response, holding constant all parameters of 
tax policy. In developing countries, where tax policy parameters 
are changed every year and sometimes in the course of the year, 
the elasticity of tax revenue is virtually impossible to estimate 
with any appreciable degree of accuracy. In such a fiscal context, 
where tax policy parameters are in a state of constant flux, the 
buoyancy coefficient may provide the only feasible alternative 
to estimating the underlying revenue-generating properties of the 
system. If estimated over a sufficiently long period of time, the 
buoyancy coefficient essentially estimates the revenue response 
with endogenised tax policy. The problem with estimation over 
a long period of course is the possible presence of structural breaks 
due to regime changes in tax effort, which will lead to serial 
correlation in the residuals and thus a biased estimate of the 
buoyancy coefficient when a log linear trend is fitted over the 
entire sample period. 
This paper estimates buoyancies for Indian states with respect 
to their own tax revenues for the period since 1980-81, not 
including tax revenues received from the centre, and not 
including their own non-tax revenues.2 Non-tax revenues of 
states display high volatility, with spikes resulting from an as- 
sortment of accounting practices, which vary from state to state. 
Chief among these, but not the only one, is the practice with 
respect to the recording of non-tax revenues from lottery 
schemes.3 Tax revenues display greater stability year-to-year, 
and are the dominant source of revenue, accounting for 80 per 
cent of own revenue collections in aggregate across states. 
Buoyancy estimates for tax revenues of states are estimated with 
respect to the gross state domestic product (GSDP). The GSDP 
estimates for states in India are available only at factor cost, not 
at market prices.4 
Section I presents the specifications estimated. Section II presents 
the buoyancy coefficients themselves from the results of the best 
specification for each state, and compares these with the buoy- 
ancies projected in the report of the Twelfth Finance Commission 
for the period 2005-10. Section III concludes the paper. 
The Specifications Estimated 
The basic estimation procedure for tax buoyancies is through 
a double log specification of the type given in equation (1) below, 
which yields the buoyancy coefficient [3p 
In (OTRt) = c1 + 1 (lnGSDPt) + ut ...(1) 
where In (OTRt) = log of (nominal) revenue in year t 
In (GSDPt) = log of (nominal) GSDP in year t 
cc = intercept 
= buoyancy estimate 
The residuals from estimation of equation (1) showed serial 
correlation for most states. This could be on account of an 
incorrect functional form (fitting a linear specification to an 
underlying non-linear relationship, for example, or where there 
is a structural break), or because of omitted variables. The 
Cochrane-Orcutt two-step estimator is a commonly used me- 
chanical way of correcting for autocorrelation, when the source 
of the problem is unknown. In the context of buoyancy estimation 
over a long period, clearly one source of the problem could be 
a kink in the underlying relationship, which would generate serial 
correlation in the residuals when fitting a log linear trend over 
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the entire sample period. Allowing for a structural break serves 
three purposes: it solves one possible source of serial correlation, 
it avoids the degrees of freedom problem that would arise if the 
buoyancy is estimated for the several periods separately, and most 
importantly it brings out regime changes in tax effort. 
A second specification was therefore fitted, allowing for struc- 
tural breaks in the tax series, marking points where there have 
been major alterations in the tax policy parameters, such that there 
is not merely a one-time change in levels, but also a change in 
the revenue-generating properties of the system. This is shown 
below in equation (2). 
In (OTRt) = oc, + (oc2-o)D 
+ [31 (lnGSDPt) + {(32-3i)D*(lnGSDPt)) + ut ...(2) 
Equation (2) has a dummy variable D which takes the value 
one for years after the single structural break in the estimation 
period, zero otherwise. There is provision for both an intercept 
change in levels, as well as a change in the slope. The coefficients 
attached to the dummy variable terms give the difference between 
the coefficient for the period when the dummy variable carries 
the value zero, and the period for which it carries the value one. 
After the structural break, the buoyancy coefficient is [2. 
The introduction of a structural break took care of serial 
correlation in the residuals for most states, as measured by the 
LM test. The year of the structural break was chosen from all 
the possible break years within the estimation period based on 
the LM test, and the significance of the coefficients of the 
intercept and slope dummies. Where there was a break in the 
1980s using the full sample period, as in the case of Karnataka, 
Kerala, Meghalaya, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and Tripura, the 
equations were re-estimated looking for another break in the 
second period using the same model. Among these six states, 
a second break was found in the case of Karnataka, Rajasthan 
and Tamil Nadu. 
Where serial correlation remained even after testing, for all 
possible structural breaks, a third equation was estimated with 
sectoral shares in GSDP.5 It is a well-known feature of the tax 
system in all developing countries that industry is more amenable 
to taxation than agriculture and services. The share of industry 
in domestic product would by prior expectation, increase steadily 
over time in such a setting, and therefore be serially correlated. 
The third specification tried, in cases where residual correlation 
persisted even in specification (2), is given below: 
ln(OTRt)=oc 1+(oc2-oc l)D+Pt(lnGSDPt) 
+{ (P2-i)D*(lnGSDPt) ) +(lnprcntindsharet)+ut ...(3) 
An alternative method by which to correct for systematic 
variations over time between the base used, GSDP in this case, 
and the true base, would be an error correction model, with the 
one-period lagged value of the dependent variable included as 
a regressor on the right hand side. That is difficult to do in the 
present case where, as will be seen, there are structural breaks 
in nearly all the states, which further occur typically in the 1990s, 
with short post-break estimation periods. 
The data on own tax revenues of states are sourced from 
RBI publications, for the period 1980-81 to 2002-03, and on 
GSDP, including sectoral shares, from the Central Statistical 
Organisation. 
Although the augmented specification actually improved the 
quality of the estimation in only a small number of states, it is 
a useful supplement to the simpler specifications normally used 
for buoyancy estimation. The sectoral share of industry in a 
developing country increases over time, and since industry in 
developing countries is the most tractable sector for taxation 
purposes, buoyancy estimation with respect to total domestic 
product alone could carry an omitted variable problem that gets 
reflected in the residuals. The alternative that is sometimes 
adopted is to estimate buoyancies with respect to industrial sector 
value added alone. 
II 
Estimated Buoyancy Coefficients 
Table 1 lists the states, with the P-lcJ! of the LM test on the 
residuals with specifications (1) and (2), and the break year in 
the second specification. The LM test is performed for two lags. 
The null hypothesis in the LM test is that there is no serial 
correlation in the series tested for. A low P-value indicates 
that the null hypothesis can be rejected with a low probability 
of error, and so indicates the presence of serial correlation. A 
high P-value indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, 
Assam shows serial correlation in the residuals even with equa- 
tion (2), with the LM test carrying a P-value of 0.12. When 
estimated with specification (3), the P-value improved to 0.65. 
This is shown in Table 2. along with some other states for 
which the P-value showed a reduction in serial correlation with 
specification (3) relative to specification (2), and the goodness 
of fit improved. 
Table 1: Results of LM Test on Residuals for Alternative 
Specifications 
State Period P-value for LM Test on Break Year 
Residuals (2 Lags) 
Equation (1) Equation (2) 
Andhra 1981-03 0.00 0.23 1994-95 
Arunachal 1987-03 0.01 0.30 1994-95 
Assam 1981-03 0.00 0.12 1995-96 
Bihar 1981-03 0.99 No break 
Goa 1987-03 0.17 No break 
Gujarat 1981-03 0.03 0.96 1994-95 
Haryana 1981-03 0.01 0.59 1995-96 
Himachal 1981-03 0.05 0.37 1991-92 
Jammu and Kashmir 1981-03 0.07 0.97 1994-95 
Karnataka 1988-03 0.15 0.82 1997-98 
Kerala 1981-03 0.02 0.24 1986-87 
Madhya Pradesh 1981-03 0.24 0.27 1993-94 
Maharashtra 1981-03 0.02 0.21 1997-98 
Manipur 1981-03 0.76 0.95 1996-97 
Meghalaya 1981-03 0.01 0.78 1986-87 
Mizoram 1988-03 0.66 No break 
Nagaland 1981-02 0.04 0.72 1992-93 
Orissa 1981-03 0.17 0.56 1997-98 
Punjab 1981-03 0.09 0.42 1997-98 
Rajasthan 1987-03 0.07 0.29 1996-97 
Sikkim 1981-03 0.02 0.35 1997-98 
Tamil Nadu 1988-03 0.00 0.18 1997-98 
Tripura 1981-03 0.03 0.53 1988-89 
Uttar Pradesh 1981-03 0.18 0.82 1994-95 
West Bengal -i981-03 0.00 0.46 1996-97 
Notes: The estimation period does not start at 1980-81 for six states: 
Arunachal, Goa and Mizoram on account of data unavailability for 
earlier years; Karnataka, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu, because the 
truncation at what was clearly the earlier of two structural breaks 
improved the goodness of fit. The estimation period ends at 2001-02 
for Nagaland for data reasons. The R-bar Squared values are not 
reported, but were uniformly high even for equation (1). 
Source: Own tax revenue from RBI, State Finances, assorted issues; GSDP 
figures from Central Statistical Organisation. The data for Bihar, Uttar 
Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh are inclusive of the figures for 
Jharkhand, Uttaranchal and Chhattisgarh for the post-partition years 
(2000-03). 
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The final set of state own tax buoyancy coefficients, as es- 
timated here for the post-break period up to 2002-03, is shown 
in Table 3. The break year in many cases is in the late 1990s, 
1996-97 or 1997-98, with a positive and statistically significant 
change in the buoyancy coefficient at the break. This spurt in 
tax effort is a plausibly endogenous response to the enhanced 
expenditure on salaries starting in the year 1996-97, with imple- 
mentation of the salary scales recommended by the Fifth Pay 
Commission. 
The advantage of identifying structural breaks rather than a 
mechanical solution like the Cochrane-Orcutt two-step estimator, 
to correct for serial correlation, is that it yields a handle on the 
timing of changes in tax policy effort. 
The direction of change at the structural break is not, however, 
positive in all cases. West Bengal, Gujarat and Kerala among 
the major states, and Himachal, Meghalaya and Tripura, in the 
Table 2: Results for Specification Inclusive 
of Industry Share in Domestic Product 
P-value for LM test on Goodness of Fit - 
Residuals AIC; SBC 
Equation (2) Equation (3) Equation (2) Equation (3) 
Assam 0.12 0.65 -2.03;-1.83 -2.26;-2.02 
Madhya Pradesh 0.27 0.36 -2.31;-2.12 -2.69;-2.44 
Rajasthan 0.29 0.64 -2.13;-1.93 -2.26;-2.01 
Tripura 0.53 0.73 -2.49;-2.29 -2.62;-2.37 
Notes: Equation (3) is estimated over the same periods and for the same 
break years as equation (2). 
Source:lbid. The set of states is confined to those for which equation (3) 
reduced serial correlation in the residuals, and improved goodness of 
fit, relative to equation (2). 
Table 3: Post-Break Own Tax Buoyancies and 
TFC Projected Buoyancies 
State Post-Break Change of Estimated TFC 
Period Sign at Break Buoyancy Projected 
Coefficient Coefficient 
Goa 1987-03 No break 1.05 1.35 
Punjab 1998-03 plus 1.61 1.35 
West Bengal 1997-03 minus 0.76 1.35 
Gujarat 1995-03 minus 0.95 1.30 
Himachal 1992-03 minus 1.07 1.30 
Karnataka 1998-03 plus 1.23 1.30 
Kerala 1987-03 minus 1.02 1.30 
Haryana 1996-03 plus 1.35 1.25 
Maharashtra 1998-03 plus 1.44 1.25 
Andhra 1995-03 plus 1.51 1.20 
Assam 1996-03 plus 1.54 1.20 
Bihar 1981-03 No break 1.12 1.20 
Jammu and Kashmir 1995-03 plus 1.55 1.20 
Madhya Pradesh 1994-03 plus 1.09 1.20 
Meghalaya 1987-03 minus 0.96 1.20 
Orissa 1998-03 plus 1.36 1.20 
Rajasthan 1997-03 plus 1.44 1.20 
Sikkim 1998-03 plus 1.81 1.20 
Tamil Nadu 1998-03 plus 1.29 1.20 
Uttar Pradesh 1995-03 plus 1.36 1.20 
Arunachal 1995-03 plus 1.73 1.10 
Manipur 1997-03 plus 2.00 1.10 
Mizoram 1988-03 No break 1.03 1.10 
Nagaland 1993-02 plus 1.01 1.10 
Tripura 1989-03 minus 1.04 1.10 
Notes: In states where there is no break, the start of the estimation period is 
dictated by data availability (see Table 1 and notes). The series in all 
states terminates at 2002-03, except for Nagaland. For the four states 
listed in Table 2, the coefficients reported here are for specification (3). 
Source: Ibid. 
special category, saw a decline in the buoyancy, at break years 
ranging between the late 1980s and late 1990s. 
The post-break buoyancies for the majority of states which 
experienced an increase in buoyancy in recent years, falls in a 
fairly high range, between 1.01 for Nagaland, and as high as 2.00 
for Manipur. It is only the states which have seen a post-break 
decline where the coefficient has dipped below one. In states with 
no discernible break, like Goa, Bihar and Mizoram, the coefficient 
is above one. 
The states are grouped by the assigned values for own tax 
buoyancies in the report of the Twelfth Finance Commission. 
The median buoyancy assigned by the TFC is 1.20, whereas the 
median buoyancy as estimated here is 1.30. There is some 
question as to whether the post-break surge in estimated buoy- 
ancies, which in many states has held for only a five-or six-year 
period going up to 2002-03, can be sustained going into the future. 
This might be the reason for the more conservative buoyancies 
projected in the TFC report. There was also a fear that the switch 
to a VAT might be revenue-reducing, but preliminary indications 
are that the VAT has been revenue-enhancing.6 
However, the TFC projected buoyancies are not uniformly 
lower than the estimated buoyancies for all states. The highest 
TFC buoyancies of 1.35 and 1.30 have been assigned to seven 
states, whose buoyancies as estimated here are well below the 
projected values in all but one case. These seven states include 
two with estimated buoyancies below one, Gujarat and West 
Bengal. At the other extreme, the TFC buoyancies of 1.10 have 
been assigned to five special category states, some of which, like 
Arunachal and Manipur, have experienced among the highest 
buoyancies, albeit starting from a low level. 
Ill 
Conclusion 
With the introduction of a destination-based VAT in all but 
eight states starting April 2005, there is need for a good baseline 
indicator of tax buoyancies in states in the period immediately 
preceding. This paper attempts to provide such a base. 
When buoyancies are estimated over a 23-year span starting 
in 1980-81, there is serial correlation in the residuals. The struc- 
tural breaks fall in the 1990s for the most part, and eliminate 
serial correlation for all but one state. A specification including 
the log of the sectoral share of industry in GSDP eliminates serial 
correlation in that one exception, and improves the goodness of 
fit for a few other states. 
The sign of the change in the buoyancy coefficient at the break 
is positive in all but six states. The set of six where there was 
a negative change at the break includes the three states with (post- 
break) buoyancy coefficients below one: Gujarat, Meghalaya and 
West Bengal. In all the rest, the post-break coefficients are 
comfortably above one. In states which experienced a buoyancy- 
enhancing structural break in the late 1990s, the spurt in tax effort 
might have been an endogenous response to the implementation 
of the higher salary scales recommended by the Fifth Pay 
Commission, starting in the year 1996-97. There is some question 
as to whether these enhanced buoyancies, which have prevailed 
typically for a post-break period of only five or six years going 
up to 2002-03, can be sustained into the future. 
The median buoyancy assigned to states for the period 2005- 
10 is 1.20 in the report of the Twelfth Finance Commission, 
whereas the median buoyancy as estimated here is 1.30. The 
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projections of the TFC for the period 2005-10 are clearly con- 
servative relative to the realised buoyancies in recent 
years. However, the cross-sectional pattern of TFC projected 
buoyancies does not accord with the cross-sectional pattern of 
buoyancies estimated in this paper. The highest TFC buoyancies 
of 1.35 and 1.30 have been assigned to seven states, where in 
all but one case, the buoyancies estimated here are well below 
the projected values. This set includes two of the three states 
which have estimated buoyancies below one, Gujarat and West 
Bengal. The TFC projected buoyancies underlie the deficit 
grants awarded to states, and therefore carry a normative com- 
ponent. What these comparisons show is that the sign and 
quantum of the normative component is not uniform, but varies 
across states. [31 
Email: indira_raja@yahoo.com 
Notes 
[The paper does not represent the views of the organisations to which the 
authors belong. The authors thank Lant Pritchett and an anonymous referee 
for useful advice, with the usual disclaimer.] 
1 The classical procedure for cleaning out the incremental impact of changes 
in tax policy parameters through the proportionate adjustment method is 
provided in Prest (1962) and Mansfield (1972). Sen (2003) offers a 
possible method of correcting for projection errors in budget estimates of 
total tax receipts, but the procedure remains dependent on official estimates 
of the impact of rate and base changes, which are mechanically drawn. 
Tanzi (1969 and 1976), provided an ingenious method by which cross- 
sectional data from sub-national regions could be used to estimate the 
elasticity of a nationally-levied tax. Clearly, this method can be extended 
to state-level taxes, provided data are available by administrative subdivision 
within each state, which is not presently the case. 
2 The Shome Committee (Government of India, 2001) provides buoyancy 
estimates in aggregate across all states for the same period. Estimates for 
earlier periods, either in aggregate or for individual states, are ij Purohit 
(1979), Rao (1979), Khadye (1981) and Bhat and Kannabiran (1992). 
There are very many other studies of elasticity and buoyancy of tax 
revenues in India, but most relate to income taxes, which are levied only 
by the national government at the centre. State-specific estimates are among 
the background estimation exercises performed for all finance commissions, 
but the reports carry only projected buoyancies, which are often unrelated 
to the historical values, and carry varying normative elements. 
3 Non-tax revenues from state lotteries are often reported gross, with payment 
of prize money reported separately in revenue expenditure and not netted 
out of receipts. Other spikes result from the episodic routing through the 
budget of notional receipts on account of bunched interest and dues from 
parastatals, against offsetting subsidies and otherexpenditures to parastatals. 
Finally, loan waivers on state debt owed to the central government enter 
non-tax receipts as an accounting entry. 
4 This will impart a slight upward bias to state-level buoyancy estimates, 
if the share of indirect taxes in total tax collections (nationally) increases 
steadily over time. 
5 In its estimates of aggregate buoyancy across states, the Shome Committee 
report (Government of India, 2001) attributes the fall from 1.12 in the 
1980s to 1.04 over the period 1990-1999 to the sectoral shift towards 
services. 
6 This could be a one-time enhancement, and may not translate into a 
buoyancy enhancement. 
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